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Abstract
The allocation of management and control in the business decision process
finds expression in the coordination intensity between agents in the firm. We
develop and test a theory, based on the organizational design literature, for the
intensity in which the tax department strives to coordinate with managers from
other business units in order to intervene in investment decisions. Our theoret-
ical considerations predict that R&D intensity is an important determinant of
the tax department’s role. Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012
of top financial and tax managers of very large multinational companies, repre-
senting 8% of business R&D spending in the OECD, we indeed find supporting
evidence that in R&D intensive multinational firms the tax department operates
more as a controller than as a manager. In particular, tax departments of R&D
intensive firms make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to minimize the
tax burden of the firm, are later involved in the decision-making process of a new
investment project, but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision on
a new investment project as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Conditional
on R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets in the firm is associ-
ated with more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results are statistically
significant and robust towards several sensitivity checks.
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1 Introduction
The focus of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of how tax planning takes
place in research and development (R&D) intensive multinational firms. Innovative
multinationals are notorious for having increased tax planning opportunities. By locat-
ing intangible assets at low tax affiliates, they can reduce the tax burden on a relevant
fraction of their economic rents. In recent years, our understanding of the existence
and functioning of this type of tax planning strategy has increased at remarkable rate.
The empirical literature provides compelling evidence for a tax-driven allocation of
intangibles within multinational groups (see Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Dischinger
and Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014). Consistently, the
tax accounting literature documents that R&D intensive firms, all other things equal,
display lower effective tax rates (ETR) than non-innovating firms (e.g. Graham et al.,
2011; Robinson et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2014).
The corporate production process in R&D intensive multinational firms, however,
does not only involve administration of intangible assets. These companies also have
to decide on where to set up R&D facilities and final output production for consumers.
Innovative activity indeed turns out increasingly mobile with firms locating their R&D
units away from their home countries, and in multiple locations (Abramovsky et al.,
2008). Surprisingly, the existing literature has largely ignored the particularities of tax
planning in R&D intensive firms with respect to these choices. In view of the OECD’s
ambitions to take action against multinational tax avoidance (OECD, 2013b), however,
it seems very important to better understand the role that tax considerations and tax
executives play in investment decisions of R&D intensive multinationals beyond the
management of intellectual property (IP). In the same vein, in their comprehensive
review of empirical tax research Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) call for more research on
tax decision-making inside the firm.
Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012 of international top financial
and tax managers, we develop and test a theory, based on the organizational design
literature, for the intensity in which the tax department coordinates with managers
from other business units to intervene in real investment decisions. We argue that in
the decision-making process, the tax department can get involved in decision control or
engage in decision management. Following Fama and Jensen (1983b), decision control
involves the ratification and monitoring of initiated projects, whereas decision man-
agement includes, in particular, the initiation and set-up of projects and thus occurs
at a much earlier stage of the decision process. According to organizational design
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theory, the optimal allocation of decision rights is determined by coordination costs,
i.e. the costs of knowledge transfer between managers, that are incurred when cen-
tralization of management and control is high, and the costs of autonomy that arise
when management and control are exercised separately. We argue that this coordina-
tion problem also drives the choice of whether the tax department serves a controlling
function ensuring tax compliance in the investment process or whether, instead, it acts
more as a manager intervening in principal investment choices such as location and
financing. Moreover, we consider R&D intensity to be an important determinant of
both the costs of coordination and the costs of autonomy. First, there is high pressure
in R&D intensive industries to keep the time to market short and the costs caused by
time delays associated with coordination between business units are very high. Second,
costs of autonomy are low in R&D intensive firms as tax-inefficiencies from autonomous
decision-making without involvement of tax experts can be reversed by separating and
tax-optimally allocating intangibles within the multinational group.
As archival data is inappropriate to address our research question, we conduct an
in-depth survey among worldwide operating multinationals headquartered in differ-
ent countries and active in diverse industries. Survey studies have been increasingly
employed in tax, accounting and finance research to gain insights that would not be
obtainable on the basis of publicly available accounting information. For example, Gra-
ham and Harvey (2001) survey CFOs on their views and practice of cost of capital,
capital budgeting and capital structure. Graham et al. (2005) investigate the determi-
nants of reported earnings and disclosure decisions, Graham et al. (2011) analyze the
location decision of real investments and repatriation decisions, while in a follow-up
study Graham et al. (2014) examine the incentives for tax planning, especially focusing
on reputational concerns. A survey study by Robinson et al. (2010) is more related to
the managerial accounting literature and investigates the decision to evaluate the tax
department as a cost center as opposed to a profit center. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first ones to provide survey evidence on the particularities of tax planning
in R&D intensive multinationals.
In this study, we present evidence from 47 respondent firms. The sample of respon-
dents is small, but we emphasize that 30 respondent firms are among the top 2,000
R&D investors and 15 are among the top 200 R&D investors worldwide as listed on
the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard.1 Nine respondent firms are among the
1The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scorboard lists the 2,000 larged R&D investors worldwide.
These 2,000 firms represent more than 90% of the total R&D expenditure by private businesses
worldwide. For more information, see http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard.html.
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Top 50 patent applicants at the European Patent Office (EPO).2 Altogether, our sam-
ple firms spent more than $50,000 million on R&D, according to their latest published
financial statements, corresponding to approximately 8% of the total business R&D
spending within the OECD in 2012 or to 7.7% of the total R&D expenditure spent in
2012 by the 2,000 largest R&D investors worldwide listed on the EU Industrial R&D
Investment Scoreboard.
We indeed document supporting evidence that in R&D intensive multinational firms
the tax department operates more as a controller than as a manager. In particular, tax
departments of R&D intensive firms make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to
minimize the tax burden of the firm, are later involved in the decision-making process
of a new investment project, but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision
on a new investment project as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Conditional on
R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets in the firm is associated with
more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results are statistically significant and
robust towards several sensitivity checks.
Our findings add to a strand of research that studies the interrelationship between
organizational architecture and tax planning. Recently, Armstrong et al. (2012) in-
vestigate the impact of tax director compensation contracts on effective tax rates.
Phillips (2003) examines the effects of compensation based performance measures of
chief executive officers and business-unit managers and finds that after-tax compen-
sation significantly lowers the reported GAAP and cash effective tax rate of a firm.
Whereas these studies are concerned with performance reward, Robinson et al. (2010)
consider performance measurement and evaluate why firms choose to evaluate a tax
department as a profit center as opposed to a cost center. In their analysis, they use
the degree of coordination between the tax department and operating units as an ex-
ogenous variable. In this paper, we want to explain the degree of coordination between
the tax department and managers from other business units. Thus, our paper puts
the focus on the third component of organizational architecture, allocation of decision
rights, whereas the previous studies consider the first two components, performance
measurement and reward. Similar to these earlier papers, we take another important
step towards unraveling the black box of tax avoidance. In this sense, our paper can also
be connected to other studies which open part of the black box of tax decision-making.
In particular, Gallemore and Labro (2013) investigate the internal information environ-
ment within firms and its effect on the reported ETR. They find that firms with high
2See http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report.html.
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internal information quality report lower ETRs. The unobservable construct of internal
information environment is measured by five proxies, which are analyst following, ana-
lyst forecast accuracy, management forecast accuracy, the speed by which management
announces financial figures such as earnings after fiscal year closing and the absence
of material weaknesses in internal control. Furthermore, Dyreng et al. (2010) propose
the conjecture that top executives may have a certain style and therefore set a certain
tone at the top with respect to tax planning. They track executives who had worked
for more than one firm over a longer period of time and indeed find a significant ef-
fect of executives on the GAAP and cash ETR. Management research has started to
focus on tax aspects, as well. Glaister and Hughes (2008) provide a case study on UK
firms analyzing the relationship between corporate strategy formulation and taxation.
They find strong support for the view that strategy decisions take priority, while tax
decisions follow subsequently in the order of precedence.
Our paper contributes to several further strands of the literature. In general, there
is a universe of theoretical and empirical research dealing with the distorting effect of
taxation on investment decisions. This literature provides robust evidence that taxes
impact on both marginal and infra-marginal investment in domestic and cross-border
contexts (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011; Hassett and Hub-
bard, 2002; Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Investment in R&D, however, is special
(Elschner and Spengel, 2010). It is particularly risky because innovation efforts require
a long-term perspective with high initial costs and uncertain outcome. On the other
hand, once successful, R&D tends to yield very high economic rents, because intellec-
tual property rights establish monopolies for a certain period of time. Time to market
plays a crucial role in order to be able to earn these rents. Moreover, R&D activity
is supposed to create positive externalities through unpaid knowledge spillovers and
considered to be crucial for competitiveness and economic growth. As a consequence,
various countries have put in place R&D tax incentives to foster innovative activity.
The effectiveness of this type of incentives has been studied extensively in the past.
R&D tax credits and additional allowances, for example, are generally found to posi-
tively impact on the scale of R&D investment (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Arundel
et al., 2008; Spengel, 2009; Elschner and Spengel, 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence
that tax considerations can lead firms to relocate and shift existing R&D activities to
tax favorable jurisdictions (Wilson, 2009; Paff, 2005; Bloom et al., 2002). Bloom and
Griffith (2001) speak of ’footloose R&D’ to emphasize the international mobility of
R&D activity.
The most substantial international tax planning opportunities in R&D intensive
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multinationals are associated with the output of the innovation process, i.e. valuable
intangible assets, rather than with inputs. A recent strand of research provides robust
evidence for a tax-driven allocation of intangibles within multinational groups. For ex-
ample, Mutti and Grubert (2009) show that US companies obtain high royalty revenues
preferably in low tax subsidiaries. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find that subsidiaries
subject to relatively low corporate tax rates show a higher level of intangible asset
investment than other affiliates in a multinational group. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012)
and more recently also Griffith et al. (2014) substantiate this finding on the basis of
patent data.
Finally, our study is connected to a strand of literature that investigates the in-
terrelationship between the tax sensitivity of capital investment and profit shifting
opportunities. The literature shows that if foreign earnings are exempt upon repatri-
ation, or taxation is deferred, the host-country tax rate is an important determinant
of foreign direct investment (e.g. Janeba, 1995; De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; Feld
and Heckemeyer, 2011). Shifting profits from a given host country to low-tax affiliates
reduces, all other things equal, the effective tax burden. In other words, the effective
tax rate levied on infra-marginal or marginal returns is no longer determined by the
local tax rate of the country where the real business activity takes place but by the
tax rate of the jurisdiction where profits are shifted. As a consequence, profit shifting
might reduce the sensitivity of investment to local tax rates and, vice versa, restricting
profit shifting opportunities can lead to increased investment responses to the local tax
rate (Hong and Smart, 2010; Haufler and Runkel, 2012). Empirical evidence for the
negative relationship between profit shifting opportunities through IP tax planning and
the sensitivity of investment to source country taxation is provided by Overesch and
Schreiber (2010). Based on German outbound FDI micro data, Overesch and Schreiber
(2010) find that R&D intensive firms’ outbound investments are less sensitive to tax
than outbound investments of less R&D intensive firms. Our study relates to this pre-
vious piece of research in that we try to investigate the functions of the tax department
in R&D intensive firms by using organizational design theory and taking a closer look
inside the firm.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our hypoth-
esis. The research design and data are discussed in Section 3. Furthermore, Section 4
explains our estimation approach. Section 5 presents our main results and robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Hypothesis Development
According to organizational design theory, the organizational architecture of a firm
depends on three columns: performance measurement, reward and punishment of per-
formance, and the partitioning of decision rights between agents within the firm (Jensen
and Meckling, 1992; Zimmerman, 2014). Previous studies have focused on the first two
columns of organizational architecture, that is the choice of performance measurement
of corporate tax departments (Robinson et al., 2010) and the role of compensation-
based incentives in corporate tax planning (Phillips, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2012). In
this paper, we are particularly interested in the factors that determine the allocation
of decision rights to the tax department and thus put the focus on the third column of
organizational design.
Along the decision-making process, the hierarchical structure of a firm must allocate
decision rights over four essential steps to different managers or agents (Jensen and
Meckling, 1992; Zimmerman, 2014). These four steps are the initiation of a certain
action, its ratification, followed by its implementation and, finally, monitoring tasks.
Fama and Jensen (1983b) use the term decision management to summarize activi-
ties that fall under initiation and implementation and the term decision control to
summarize ratification and monitoring. Considering the construction of a new plant,
for example, the initiation proposal about whether and where to invest in new facil-
ities may primarily come from division managers with specialized knowledge of the
production process and product demand from customers.3 In the ratification process,
senior management assembles knowledge from specialists in finance, human resources,
legal, and other departments. Construction of the project, i.e. implementation, is the
responsibility of the proposing managers or a separate facilities department within the
firm. After construction is completed, internal accountants prepare financial reports to
monitor the division operating the project.
Obviously, when firms are sufficiently complex, the relevant knowledge needed to
make an investment decision is dispersed among several agents in the firm. Hence,
several agents will be involved in the decision-making process and the firm needs some
mechanism to structure the way decisions are made. We are interested in the role of tax
experts in this process. We think that two scenarios are possible. On the one hand, the
tax department could primarily be involved in controlling tasks, supporting ratification
and monitoring of the project, and thus acting separately from management activity.
3The example is taken from Zimmerman (2014), p. 146.
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A tax department that acts as a controller rather than a manager concentrates, for
example, on ensuring that local and international tax legislation is complied with but
it does not intervene in the structuring of the project. The management of the project
would, in this case, be rather decentralized in the hands of the specialized division
managers. On the other hand, the tax department could act much more as a manager
and be involved in the initial stage of the decision process, for example by preselecting
potential investment locations and coordinating directly with the initiating division
managers. Thus, the decision process would be more centralized and management and
control functions would be exercised in a less separated fashion.
The question of whether the tax department acts more as a manager or as a con-
troller reflects the optimal choice of coordination intensity with other departments and
divisions in the firm. Coordination intensity with experts and managers from other
departments or divisions will be increasing in the tax department’s intervention in
decision management. For example, if the tax department gets involved in project ini-
tiation, specialized division managers and the tax department will have to coordinate
to preselect potential investment locations, taking into account important tax aspects
and non-tax factors related to local conditions of production and demand. The cost of
coordination result from communication and the so caused delay in making a decision.
Cost of delay are costs for missing out opportunities, because transferring knowledge
(i.e. coordinating) takes time (Szulanski, 2000; Zimmerman, 2014).
In this coordination problem, the cost of coordination have to be balanced with the
cost of autonomy (Emery, 1969). Cost of autonomy emerge from the forgone use of
valuable knowledge in the decentralized decision-making process, which can result in
inefficient or even entirely wrong decisions. In our context, the costs of autonomy (of
the initiating division managers) can best be understood as forgone tax savings due to
inefficient use of the tax experts’ knowledge.4
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between coordination intensity I, represented
on the horizontal axis, and associated costs C, represented on the vertical axis. The
ascending curves represent coordination costs, while the descending curves represent
the autonomy costs. With increasing coordination intensity the cost of coordination
increase, while the cost of autonomy decrease. The total costs are the sum of coordi-
4We use the more general concept and term ’autonomy costs’ as e.g. in Emery (1969), instead of
referring to the term ’agency costs’ as used in Jensen and Meckling (1992), Fama and Jensen (1983a)
and Fama and Jensen (1983b). Agency costs occur when agents dispose of private information and do
not share common interests. Here, we want to leave open the question whether the tax department
and other specialized division managers have conflicting or congruent interests. In any case, with
decreasing coordination, the efficiency costs of autonomous decision-making tend to increase.
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Figure 1: Coordination Intensity Choice
coordination cost curve
autonomy cost curve
total cost curve
I1I2 I
C
Notes: Own source, according to Emery (1969). The ascending curves represent the coordination
cost curves, while the descending curves represent the autonomy cost curves. The U-shaped curves
represent the total cost curves. The grey curves depict the initial situation. We hypothesize that in
R&D intensive firms both curves are shifted to the left, as represented by the black curves. The total
cost minimum is at the point of equality of the absolute slopes of the autonomy cost and coordination
cost curves. In this figure, the point of equal absolute slopes coincides with the intersection of the two
cost curves.
nation and autonomy costs, represented by the U-shaped curve. The minimum of the
total cost curve indicates the optimal level of coordination intensity, here at I1.
5 In our
context, the horizontal axis, depicting coordination intensity, also reflects the nature
of the tax departments’ tasks. At the right end of the continuum, the tasks of the tax
department are managerial in nature, i.e. highly coordination intensive. At the left end,
they are of a controlling type with little coordination between tax experts and man-
agers of other business units. Accordingly, the tax departments’ choice of coordination
intensity with other business units ultimately reflects the decision on the nature of its
tasks. Hence, the minimum of the total cost curve represents the optimal bundle of the
5The optimal coordination intensity, i.e. the minimum of total costs, is at the point of equality of
the absolute slopes of the autonomy cost and the coordination cost curves, which in Figure 1 coincides
with the intersection of the two curves.
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tax department’s managerial and controlling tasks.
We argue that in R&D intensive firms, the optimal level of coordination intensity
between the tax department and other business units is lower relative to non-innovating
firms, here at I2.
6 In other words, the tax department in highly R&D intensive firms
carries out more controlling activities rather than managerial tasks as compared to less
R&D intensive companies. We present two principal reasons for our hypothesis:
First, coordination costs in terms of delay costs from lost opportunities are especially
high in R&D intensive businesses. The first applicant of a patent has the chance to be
granted a monopoly and to extract the associated economic rents, while the runner-up
will potentially face important economic and legal barriers to market entry. Moreover,
in many high-tech industries, products and innovations follow sharp life cycle patterns.
Missing out on the start of a new product cycle means that chances to successfully
commercialize one’s product are drastically reduced because the pioneers will have
seized the market, at least for the lifetime of that new innovation. As a consequence,
many companies engaged in R&D put a strong focus on ’time to market’ which becomes
the primary target dimension in the management of R&D projects (Brem, 2008). In
Figure 1, the coordination cost curve for R&D intensive firms is represented by the
black ascending curve. It is shifted to the left relative to the ’standard’ coordination
cost curve for non-innovating firms, representing the increased costs of delay at given
levels of coordination intensity.
A second reason for the optimal level of coordination intensity being comparably
low in R&D intensive firms relates to the costs of autonomy that arise as a decreasing
function of coordination intensity. More specifically, we argue that R&D intensive firms
have enhanced opportunities to shift paper profits toward low-tax jurisdictions because
R&D activity tends to produce both highly mobile and highly specific intangible assets,
which can be separated from the R&D inputs and migrated to low-tax subsidiaries in a
tax efficient way.7 R&D intensive firms thus may care less about taxes in the investment
decision process because they have considerable tax planning opportunities at a later
stage, i.e. after the investment project has been implemented, and can substantially
reduce their effective tax burden no matter where the real economic activity takes
6Again, the optimal coordination intensity, i.e. the minimum of total costs, is at the point of
equality of the absolute slopes of the autonomy cost and the coordination cost curves, which in Figure
1 coincides with the intersection of the two curves.
7For empirical evidence on the tax sensitivity of intangible asset location, see Dischinger and Riedel
(2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012).
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place.8 Hence, the autonomy costs in terms of forgone tax savings that result from
low coordination intensity between the tax department and other division managers
initiating an investment project are low because inefficiencies from a tax point of view
can be partially reversed by tax planning with IP. Graphically, this mechanism available
to R&D intensive firms is reflected by the black descending autonomy cost curve which
is shifted to the left relative to the autonomy cost curve for non-innovating firms. As
both the autonomy and the coordination cost curves for R&D intensive firms are shifted
to the left, so is the optimal coordination intensity between the tax department and
initiating division managers (from I1 to I2 in Figure 1).
In sum, the optimal level of coordination intensity in R&D intensive firms is reduced
for two reasons: First, coordination between R&D managers and the tax department is
costly, because the cost of delaying an R&D related decision may be exorbitantly high.
Second, R&D intensive firms often hold IP that enables them to engage in tax planning
no matter where the economic activity actually takes place. These opportunities may
help them to compensate tax inefficiencies from low coordination in the initial stage of
the investment decision by engaging in IP tax planning ex post. Thus, our hypothesis
is the following:
Hypothesis: In R&D intensive firms, the tax department carries out more
controlling rather than managerial tasks than in less R&D intensive firms.
We argue that the tax department’s management-control choice manifests itself in
four dimensions, which we are able to directly observe in our survey. These are the
effort the tax department makes for tax planning relative to compliance and reporting,
the department’s ambitions to minimize the overall tax burden of the firm relative to
tax risk management, the temporal involvement of the tax department in investment
decisions and the ultimate decision rights the tax department has in the investment
decision. These characteristics are supposed to describe the nature of the tax depart-
ment’s tasks. We argue that the more the company’s tax experts act as managers in
the business decision process, the more time they spend on active tax planning relative
to mere reporting and compliance tasks. We also suppose that a decision managing tax
department tends to have high ambitions to minimize the firm’s tax burden and it gets
involved early in the initiation phase of the decision process, whereas a controlling tax
department comes in at later stages for ratification and monitoring of decisions. With
respect to ultimate decision rights, the strongest right, the right to veto, will rather
8In line with this notion, Overesch and Schreiber (2010) provide empirical evidence that the impact
of taxes on investment decisions decreases with increasing R&D intensity.
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rest with the tax department that serves as a controller rather than with a managing
tax department.
Table 1: Predictions
Tax Department acts Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
more as a ...
high R&D intensity ... controller - - - +
low R&D intensity ... manager + + + -
Notes: + / - indicates the predicted direction of the effect of R&D intensity on each of the four
dimensions, efforts, ambitions, temporal involvement and rights.
As stated above, we hypothesize that high R&D intensity leads the tax department
to adopt more controlling tasks because the cost of coordination, particularly in the
form of time delay, may be exorbitantly high. What that means for each separate di-
mension is shown in Table 1. We expect that a high R&D intensity is associated with
less tax planning effort, less ambitions and a later involvement of the tax executives
in the decision-making process. Therefore, the predicted effect of R&D intensity on ef-
forts, ambitions and temporal involvement is negative.9 On the other hand, we expect
that R&D intensity is positively associated with rights, because this dimension is in-
versely related to the management-control-choice, i.e. tax departments that have more
controlling tasks are more likely to have a veto right in the decision-making process.
Consequently, the hypothesis that R&D intensive firms’ tax departments act more as
a controller rather than as a manager comes along with a predicted positive effect of
R&D intensity on the rights of the tax department.
3 Research Method and Sample
3.1 Survey Approach
Many previous studies have investigated the effect taxes have on R&D investment and
most of them have empirically tested their hypotheses by means of large archival data
9We acknowledge that it may appear difficult to disentangle the effect that R&D intensity has
on tax planning efforts and ambitions. We argue that the tax department is less involved in active
investment decision management and planning both because it wants to avoid time delays and because
it can much more efficiently shift profits after the investment took place by migrating mobile and firm-
specific intangible assets to low-tax jurisdictions, i.e. through contract R&D agreements (for a more
detailed discussion on different migration strategies see Section 4.2). Obviously, this ex post IP and
profit migration requires some tax planning effort and ambition itself. In the empirical analysis, we
will try to isolate the influences on the four dimensions associated with the management of IP.
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sets. Data that has commonly been used to study R&D investment is R&D expenditure
(Bloom and Griffith, 2001; Bloom et al., 2002), royalty income (Mutti and Grubert,
2009), balance sheet data on intangible asset holdings (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011)
or the number of patent applications (Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel,
2012; Boehm et al., 2012; Ernst et al., 2014). Instead, we conducted a survey in cooper-
ation with the internationally operating tax consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC). A major advantage of surveys is the elicitation of otherwise unobservable data
(Serita, 2008). As we are interested to gain a deeper understanding of how firm char-
acteristics influence the role the tax department plays in the decision-making process,
archival accounting databases would not help us to address our research question.
We designed the questionnaire and entered into a cooperation with PwC, who con-
ducted the survey among preselected global client firms. The preselection of firms was
done by PwC to compose a sample of large and multinationally operating firms. Af-
ter we had designed a first draft of the questionnaire, we made several revisions to it
based on feedback from academics in the areas of marketing, finance, accounting and
economics. Moreover, three firms beta-tested the questionnaire and provided feedback
on the length of the questionnaire and on the readability and comprehensibility of the
content to us. Finally, we asked 39 questions, while the questions considerably differed
in length and some questions comprised subsections.10 The questionnaire is 20 pages
long, where we assumed that it will take one minute per page to answer the questions.
We divided the questionnaire in three subparts. The first part addresses the role of tax
considerations in R&D-related business decisions. The second part contains questions
regarding the organizational integration of the tax and R&D function. The last part
asks for company characteristics of the respondent firm.
The questionnaire was sent out by PwC to its client firms in August 2012. The survey
was closed in October 2013. Throughout this period, we sent several reminders to the
contacted firms. Out of 321 questionnaires that were sent out, 47 firms returned the
questionnaire properly filled out. Thus, the response rate was approximately 15%.
Survey data also entails some drawbacks. The major concern is measurement error
caused by inappropriate answers. The answer a respondent gives can be inappropriate
due to the lack of knowledge or that the respondent feels uncomfortable to openly
and correctly answer the survey questions. Concerns on the part of respondents to
honestly answer survey questions might be a problem in our context as international tax
planning is generally not well received by public opinion. Respondents might therefore,
10This paper analyzes selected questions from the questionnaire.
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consciously or subconsciously, be tempted to conceal the true role of tax considerations
in their business decisions.
These potential difficulties have to be addressed carefully prior to conducting the
survey, especially in the design of the questionnaire and in the way the survey is
conducted. Following previous survey studies in the accounting and finance literature
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Graham et al., 2005, 2011) we dealt with these issues in
several ways, which we discuss in the following. As we only asked tax experts to fill
out the survey, we do not worry that the respondents randomly chose their answers.
If the respondent was not motivated to fill out the survey, he could easily refuse to
do it. Also, we rely on the expert knowledge of the respondents and believe that the
questions we asked were understood correctly. Nevertheless, we included a question to
indicate the job title of the person who filled out the form. From the 47 respondents,
29 respondents are head of the tax department, one respondent is the vice president of
the tax department, four are CFO of the company, one respondent is the vice president
of the CFO, six are local tax managers, one respondent is the CEO of the company,
one the assistant to the CEO and another one the assistant to the CFO and, finally,
three respondents did not report their job title.
We are aware that some of our questions are sensitive as we also focus on tax planning
strategies. These questions are critical, because respondents might not want to answer
such questions correctly. First, we made clear that we are only interested in legal tax
planning schemes, which is distinct from illegal tax evasion. Second, we decided that
PwC conducts the survey for us, because firms will probably have confidence in the
integrity and discreetness of their consultancy firm. In the survey, we made clear that all
answers will be forwarded to us, the researchers, in anonymous form. We also included a
paragraph on data security and confidentiality in the introduction to the questionnaire.
We assured our respondents that the data reported in the questionnaire would be
treated confidentially and that results would be published in aggregate form only.
Last, we pointed out that respondents may also return an uncompleted questionnaire
in case they were unable to answer some of the questions. That information was also
meant to ensure that respondents felt free to leave some questions unanswered if they
were uncomfortable with them.
3.2 Survey Data and Sample
The following Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the characteristics of the 47
respondent firms. Half of respondents are located in Germany, followed by the US
14
and Switzerland. Furthermore, the sample comprises firms from Australia, Austria,
Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico, South Africa and the UK. Most firms are publicly
traded (35 firms), but our sample also comprises eleven private firms and one firm that
indicated some other ownership structure, although without specifying it any further.
The majority of respondent firms are operating in heavy industries (16 firms), followed
by the manufacturing industry (9 firms).
Table 2: Company characteristics of respondent firms
Group’s parent country (N = 47) # of firms Industry (N = 47) # of firms
Australia 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 1
Austria 1 Mining, construction 4
Finland 1 Manufacturing: food, textiles
Germany 25 and chemicals 9
Hong Kong 1 Heavy industries 16
Israel 1 Transport and utilities 3
Mexico 2 Wholesale and retail trade 1
South Africa 1 Banking, finance, insurance,
Switzerland 6 real estate 3
United Kingdom 1 Information technologies 4
United States 7 Health, pharmaceuticals,
biotechnologies 4
Ownership (N = 47) Public administration 2
Public 35
Private 11
Other 1
Notes: The group’s parent country indicates the country of incorporation of the global ultimate owner
company of the respective respondent firm. Industry classification is based on the US Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) standard industrial classification (SIC).
On average, our respondents have total assets of $70,800 million, total liabilities of
$52,300 million and total sales of $30,000 million. The average net income is $1,830
million and the return on assets is 6.19%. The average respondent firm employs 61,537
people (full-time equivalents), where 5,537 of these are employed in R&D, and is ap-
proximately 87 years old. The average balance sheet amount of intangible assets is
slightly more than one tenth of the total assets ($7,960 million) and the average spend-
ing on R&D is $1,240 million per year. The total R&D spending of all sample firms
amounts to approximately $53,400 million. This corresponds to approximately 30% of
the total business R&D spending in the EU27 in 2012 or to 8% of the total business
R&D spending within the OECD in 2012.11 This share appears very high in view of
11The total business R&D spending in the EU27 in 2012 amounts to $176,744.85 millions and the
total business R&D spending within the OECD in 2012 amounts to $649,214.01 millions. The figures
are taken from the OECD database on business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD). The figures
are measured at constant prices and PPP.
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the small number of firms we survey. However, the distribution of R&D expenditure
across firms worldwide is highly skewed, meaning that the majority of R&D spending
is concentrated in the hands of only a few firms. This is highlighted by the EU Indus-
trial R&D Investment Scoreboard published by the European Commission (EC), which
covers the top 2,000 investors in R&D worldwide. These 2,000 firms represent more
than 90% of the total R&D expenditure by private businesses.12 Our sample contains
30 firms that are among the top 2,000, and even 15 that are among the top 200 Score-
board firms. In sum, our sample covers 7.7% of the top 2,000 firms’ aggregate R&D
expenditure in the year 2012. Moreover, we emphasize that 9 respondents are among
the Top 50 applicant firms to the European Patent Office.
Table 3: Selected descriptive statistics of respondent firms
Variable # Observations Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Total assets 47 70,800 22,800 113 685,000
Total liabilities 47 52,300 14,200 167 625,000
Total sales 47 30,000 18,000 140 147,000
Net income 46 1,830 662 -778 13,600
Return on assets 45 6.19% 6.10% -34.64% 29.16%
Intangible assets 45 7,960 1,400 0 85,400
R&D expenses 43 1,240 193 0 6,790
Total employees 47 61,537 44,000 480 380,000
R&D employees 35 5,537 1,000 0 38,500
Firm Age 47 87 100 0 179
Notes: All financial statement information is in million US Dollars. Firm age is measured in years.
One limitation to survey research is selection bias in the answers due to self-selection
of respondents (Dillman, 1978). Firms or managers may decide themselves whether to
answer the survey or not and therefore, they select themselves into two groups, the
group of respondents and the group of non-respondents. The concern of selection bias
is related to the generalizability of the results and conclusions drawn from the survey.
One form of selection bias is non-response bias that arises if the group of respondents
is systematically different to the group of non-respondents in observable characteris-
tics that influence the subject of interest in our study (i.e. R&D related tax planning
behavior). Another form of selection bias arises if the group of contacted firms system-
atically differs from the population that is researched. Hence, we draw comparisons to
address both of these concerns. First, we compare the sample of respondents to bigger
populations, i.e. to the group of non-respondents and the group of firms that are part of
the Standard & Poors (S&P) 1200 Index. Second, we compare our sample of contacted
12See the European Commission’s press release on November 18, 2013:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-1000 en.htm.
16
firms with the group of S&P 1200 firms. The S&P 1200 Index is a stock market index
that covers the 1,200 worldwide biggest and publicly traded companies. It comprises
approximately 70% of the world’s stock market capitalization. Since the bigger part of
R&D is concentrated in the hands of a few but very large multinational firms, we are
interested to learn how our sample compares to this population of firms, and, therefore,
use the sample of S&P 1200 companies as a comparison group.
Table 4: Non-Response Bias Tests
All Firms Survey Survey
we Contacted Nonresponders Responders
S&P with Available with Available with Available
1200 Data Data Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
RDINT 675 0.03 128 0.04 85 0.04 43 0.03
IPINT 1,197 0.19 147 0.20 102 0.21 45 0.17
SIZE 1,209 23,800 149 31,900 102 32,800 47 30,000
ROA 1,209 0.07 147 0.07 102 0.07 45 0.06
LEV 1,206 0.60 149 0.79 102 0.62 47 1.17
GROW 1,207 0.15 146 0.05 101 0.05 45 0.07
INVINT 1,189 0.08 147 0.12 102 0.11 45 0.13
CAPINT 1,186 0.28 145 0.21 101 0.22 44 0.20
p-Value
1 vs. 2 1 vs. 4 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4
RDINT 0.0573 0.7419 0.5462 0.3925
IPINT 0.0508 0.8792 0.2566 0.1199
SIZE 0.4426 0.1122 0.5241 0.3776
ROA 0.3641 0.8115 0.7779 0.6990
LEV 0.2773 0.4240 0.9342 0.9089
GROW 0.1006 0.7707 0.5527 0.4146
INVINT 0.0000 0.0005 0.4488 0.2992
CAPINT 0.0470 0.0888 0.6037 0.4780
Notes: Columns (1) to (4) represent different populations as stated. P-values are based on a two-tailed
Wilcoxon test and indicate significant differences among the different populations in the variables
observed. All variables are obtained from the Compustat Global and Compustat North America
Database and are measured as of 2012. R&D intensity, abbreviated by RDINT, is R&D expenses
(XRD) scaled by total assets (AT), IP intensity, abbreviated by IPINT is intangible assets (INTAN)
to total assets (AT), size is measured by total sales (SALE) and is in million USD, ROA is the return
on assets defined as net income (NI) scaled by total assets (AT), leverage, abbreviated by LEV, is
calculated as liabilities (LT) over total assets (AT), asset growth is the percentage change in total assets
to the one-year lag total assets (AT), inventory and capital intensity, abbreviated by INVINT and
CAPINT respectively, is total inventories (INVT) and net property, plant and equipment (PPENT)
respectively over total assets (AT).
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics of all samples and p-values from a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test to indicate whether the samples are significantly different from each
other. To test for possible selection bias we group firms into four different samples
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represented in columns (1) to (4) of Table 4. Column (1) comprises the set of firms
that during January 2011 and December 2013 were at least once part of the S&P
1200 Index.13 Column (2) comprises all contacted firms that were sent a questionnaire.
Finally, this column is split in the group of non-respondents (column (3)) and the
sample of respondents (column (4)).
Overall, with respect to most characteristics we evaluate, our sample of respondents
is similar to the S&P 1200. The firms in the sample only differ from the S&P 1200
in terms of inventory and capital intensity. In other words, the S&P 1200 companies
have similar distributions of R&D intensity, IP intensity, total sales, return on assets,
leverage, and asset growth. Comparing all contacted firms with the S&P 1200 Index,
our contacted firms differ significantly from the S&P 1200 in terms of R&D and IP
intensity, in inventory and in capital intensity. Nonetheless, they are similar in terms
of size, return on assets, leverage and asset growth. Comparing the characteristics of
respondent firms to those of the firms we contacted and to those of non-respondents,
we do not find that the respondent firms differ significantly from these two groups.
To sum up, contacted and responding firms are different from S&P 1200 firms along
some few dimensions. Therefore, our results might not generalize to the whole sample of
S&P 1200 firms. Nonetheless, there is no indication for systematic differences between
firms that answered our survey and those that did not answer.14
4 Estimation Strategy
Our aim is to explore whether R&D intensity influences the coordination intensity of
the tax department with other operational units within the firm. Since the tax de-
partment’s management-control-choice is difficult to observe, we decided to measure
specific characteristics of the tax department. Precisely, we assume that the tax depart-
ments’ position on the continuum between management and control manifests itself in
four dimensions. These are the tax departments’ tax planning efforts, its tax planning
ambitions, its temporal involvement and its ultimate decision rights.
13The sample of column (1), therefore, contains slightly more than 1,200 firms.
14Generalizability requires a representative sample and, additionally, a sample size that is large
enough to reduce the margin of error to conventional levels. Even if our sample of respondents was
similar to the relevant comparison group in all characteristics, we would still be cautious about gener-
alizing our findings to the whole population of firms due to our small sample. Limited generalizability
is a general limitation of survey research in accounting and taxation and has been encountered by
previous studies as well (e.g. Graham et al., 2011, 2014). Still, we believe that survey studies provide
valuable contributions to unravel the black box of tax decision-making.
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The data on these four dimensions comes from the questionnaire. While the first
dimension - tax planning effort - is a proportion, the other three dimensions - ambitions,
temporal involvement and rights - are ordinal variables measured on a five-point scale.
Tax planning efforts are measured by the approximate time (in % of total workload)
that is spent on tax planning activities, as opposed to activities linked to compliance
and financial reporting, by tax executives. Ambitions, temporal involvement and rights
are measured on a five-point scale respectively, ranging from 0 to 4. We ask ’How
important is the minimization of the group’s tax burden as an objective for your group’s
tax department?’ to measure the ambitions of the tax department. A 0 on the response
scale indicates that minimization of the group’s tax burden is not at all an important
objective of the tax department, while 4 indicates that tax minimization is a very
important goal. Furthermore, we ask ’Starting from which stage during the planning
phase of an investment project are the tax executives involved in the decision-making?’
to measure the temporal involvement in the decision process. 0 again indicates the
lowest parameter value, which we equate to a very late involvement of the tax executives
and which we scenarize as ’The decision has been made; tax executives optimize given
the target location’. A value of 4 instead means that the tax department gets involved
very early and preselects potential targets in the initiation phase of the decision process.
Last, ultimate decision rights are measured by the question ’During the planning phase
of an investment project, how would you characterize the role of the tax executives?’
and which ranges from 0, No rights, the decision is made without consultation of tax
executives, to 4, Tax executives have a veto right.
To analyze the relationship between R&D intensity and each of these four dimen-
sions, we will perform bivariate tests and regression analyses. Throughout the empirical
analysis, we will take into account that our sample is small from a statistical point of
view. Standard econometric methods used for hypothesis testing rely on sampling dis-
tributions that are approximately normal. The assumption of normality is without
problems and justified by the central limit theorem if the sample size is large. However,
given our sample size of slightly less than 50 observations, assuming a normal (approx-
imate) sampling distribution may potentially be inaccurate. For our bivariate tests, we
will therefore use the Wilcoxon rank-sum test15 as a robust non-parametric alternative
to the common Student’s t-test (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 1947). However,
the normal approximation to the sampling distribution can still be accurate in samples
as small as 30 observations (p. 89 in Stock and Watson, 2012). We will therefore make
statistical inferences on the basis of t-tests as well.
15Also known as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test, Mann-Whitney-U-Test, or U-Test.
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The regression analysis will estimate an empirical model of the following form
DIMi = β0 + β1RDINTi + β2SIZEi + β3ROAi + β4LEVi
+β5GROWi + β6INV INTi + β7CAPINTi + β8AGEi + i
(1)
where DIMi abbreviates the four different dimensions and RDINTi represents R&D
intensity, our variable of main interest.
Our hypothesis (see Section 2) predicts that with increasing R&D intensity it be-
comes more likely that the tax department takes the position of a controller rather than
that of a manager. We measure R&D intensity (RDINT) by the firm’s R&D expenses
scaled by total assets. Furthermore, we include a number of control variables that likely
co-determine the tax department’s management-control-choice.
Previous literature substantiates the notion that tax planning opportunities and
incentives influence the actual tax avoidance behavior of firms (Manzon and Plesko,
2002; Mills, 1998; Rego, 2003; Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al., 2008). Since the tax
avoidance behavior of a firm is closely related to the nature of the tax department’s
tasks, we think that tax planning opportunities and incentives may also influence the
management-control-choice of the tax department. Consequently, the first set of control
variables capture real tax planning opportunities: Theoretically, it has been argued
that the size of the firm increases complexity and, therefore, impacts negatively on
the management-control-choice of a firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). The empirical
evidence, however, reports mixed results. Early evidence by Zimmerman (1983) finds
a positive effect of firm size on tax planning and documents that larger firms face
higher tax payments. More recently, studies regarding the determinants of the ETR
find negative (Boone et al., 2013; Chyz et al., 2013) as well as positive (Hope et al., 2013;
Chyz et al., 2013) significant elasticities of firm size. Hence, the effect of firm size is a
priori ambiguous. Our empirical analysis contains the logarithm of total sales (SIZE)
to control for firm size. In line with Fama and Jensen (1983b), we expect that firm size
likely increases complexity and consequently leads to less coordination intensity.
Furthermore, we include the return on assets (ROA) to capture the profitability of
a firm, as the literature suggests that profitable firms might have more incentives for
tax planning (Chen et al., 2010; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Thus, we expect that high
profitable firms make more effort on tax planning. In general, we suppose that prof-
itability positively impacts on coordination-intensity. Furthermore, we include leverage
(LEV) calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets to control for the debt tax
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shield benefit resulting from the deductibility of interest expenses. Lastly, we control
for asset growth (GROW) by calculating the one-year percentage growth rate of total
assets. Although the findings of Keating (1997) and Bankman (1994) suggest a neg-
ative impact of growth on tax planning efforts, more recent literature often does not
find statistically significant effects of growth on firms’ tax avoidance behavior as, for
example, reflected in the reported GAAP ETR (Robinson et al., 2010; Chen et al.,
2010; Phillips, 2003).
The second set of control variables capture book-tax planning opportunities. Con-
trary to real tax planning, where real activities are undertaken in a tax optimal way,
book-tax planning refers to the tax optimal reporting in the financial as well as in the
tax accounts. We include inventory intensity (INVINT) and capital intensity (CAP-
INT), because inventory and capital intensive firms are more affected by different valu-
ation methods for tax and financial reporting purposes (Hope et al., 2013). Given that
these firms have more tax planning opportunities, we could expect a positive effect on
coordination intensity. On the other hand, the tax planning opportunities may also
reduce the cost of autonomy and thus, cause the tax department to act more as a
controller. This argument would substantiate a finding of a negative effect of inventory
and capital intensity on coordination intensity. Taken together, the effects are a priori
ambiguous. We calculate inventory intensity as inventory scaled by total assets and
capital intensity as net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Last, we
also control for the age of the tax unit. We do not have a prediction for the effect of tax
unit age on coordination intensity, because tax unit age has not been studied in empir-
ical analyses of tax planning behavior so far. On the one hand, older tax departments
may have more routine and therefore coordinate more efficiently. Hence, one would
expect a positive impact of age on coordination intensity due to lower coordination
costs. On the other hand, a younger tax department may have to make higher efforts
on tax planning as compared to compliance tasks, because it is not yet familiar with
the task, which would result in a negative effect of tax department age on coordination
intensity.
In sum, we include several firm specific characteristics to control for a potential
systematic correlation between R&D intensity and firm specific characteristics. We
control for firm size (SIZE) by including the logarithm of total sales, profitability (ROA)
by including the return on assets, leverage (LEV) by including the quotient of liabilities
over total assets, asset growth (GROW) by including the one-year percentage growth
rate of total assets, inventory (INVINT) and capital intensity (CAPINT) by including
the quotient of inventory over total assets and the quotient of plant, property and
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equipment over total assets and the age of the tax department (AGE).
For purposes of our regression analyses, we dichotomize the ordinal dimensions and
estimate our regressions using OLS. The dichotomized variables take on the value 1
if the respondent’s answer was 3 or 4, and takes on 0 otherwise. Thus, the value 1,
respectively, stands for tax minimization being an important or very important goal,
tax executives being involved early or very early, tax executives having strong or even
veto rights. We could also use non-linear response models to estimate the three regres-
sions with qualitative dependent variables (ambitions, temporal involvement, decision
rights). Indeed the linear probability model, which we prefer, is not beyond redemp-
tion. In particular, the predictions from the model cannot be constrained to the 0-1
interval (Greene, 2012).16 Alternatively, some of the prominent problems associated
with the linear probability model can be overcome by making the probability for one
a non-linear, rather than a linear, function of the covariates. In contrast to the linear
model, however, exact (small sample) properties of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) es-
timator of logit and probit models cannot be established (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984)
and the literature on the small sample behavior of the ML estimator for binary regres-
sion models is rather limited (Chen and Giles, 2012). As outlined above, the central
limit theorem can hold already in small samples of 30-50 observations and the normal
approximation to the distribution of the OLS estimator should be appropriate. Thus,
when using OLS we have more confidence in our inferences about the true empirical
relationship between the explanatory variables of interest and the four dimensions of
the tax department’s role in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, we will check
whether our results are sensitive to the choice of linear vs. non-linear estimation.
The data are primarily taken from the questionnaire. However, we also resort to data
from Compustat Global and Compustat North America. When neither questionnaire
data nor Compustat data is available, we also use the Worldscope database provided
by Thomson Reuters. In addition, we always cross-checked the data obtained from the
questionnaire with publicly available data from these alternative databases. Where we
encountered any errors or even missing observations in all three data sources, we hand-
collected the data from the consolidated financial statements directly. Nevertheless, we
sometimes could not identify the necessary data in the financial statements and some
firms did not even publish their reports, which leaves us with a few missing observations
in our final sample. The consolidated financial statement information refers to the
16For an exchange on the usefulness of the linear probability model, see Angrist (2001) and Moffitt
(2001). Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the linear probability model is applied, among many others,
by Caudill (1988), Heckman and MaCurdy (1985), and Heckman and Snyder (1997).
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Table 5: Cross-Correlation Table
Variables RDINT IPINT SIZE ROA LEV GROW INVINT CAPINT AGE
RDINT 1.0000
IPINT 0.1208 1.0000
(0.4402)
SIZE -0.1248 -0.0406 1.0000
(0.4253) (0.7914)
ROA -0.0108 0.1452 0.0996 1.0000
(0.9453) (0.3413) (0.5150)
LEV -0.1363 -0.1770 -0.3590 0.1052 1.0000
(0.3835) (0.2448) (0.0132) (0.4917)
GROW -0.0417 -0.0094 -0.0772 -0.0794 -0.1144 1.0000
(0.7908) (0.9511) (0.6142) (0.6040) (0.4544)
INVINT 0.0463 -0.1283 -0.2678 -0.1183 0.0404 0.0426 1.0000
(0.7682) (0.4010) (0.0753) (0.4391) (0.7924) (0.7813)
CAPINT -0.2293 -0.1337 0.1765 0.0768 -0.0453 0.1829 0.0932 1.0000
(0.1440) (0.3868) (0.2518) (0.6205) (0.7704) (0.2346) (0.5475)
AGE -0.1037 -0.0185 0.5122 -0.0927 -0.3120 0.2090 -0.3513 0.1626 1.0000
(0.5083) (0.9039) (0.0002) (0.5449) (0.0328) (0.1683) (0.0180) (0.2915)
Notes: The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical
analyses and reports p-values in brackets. Bold indicates that the Pearson correlation coefficient is
statistically significant at p < 0.05.
last publicly available financial statements from the date when the questionnaire was
returned to us.
Table 5 presents cross correlations among our explanatory variables. R&D intensity
is negatively correlated with capital intensity, size in terms of total sales is negatively
correlated with leverage and inventory intensity and positively correlated with the
tax department’s age. The tax department’s age is, moreover, positively correlated
with asset growth and negatively correlated with leverage and inventory intensity.
Most correlations, however, are small and, thus, rule out potential concerns about
multicollinearity.
5 Results
5.1 Bivariate Analysis
First, we present results from bivariate analyses. For each variable of interest, we split
the sample into firms above and below the respective median value. For example, with
respect to R&D intensity, we form one group of firms showing high R&D intensity and
another group of firms displaying low R&D intensity, where high and low is defined by
the median R&D intensity. We then use a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to figure out whether
tax departments in the two groups of firms take different roles in the decision process,
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as reflected by their tax planning efforts, ambitions, the timing of involvement and
ultimate decision rights. Remember that the first dimension - tax planning efforts - is
a continuous variable, whereas all other dimensions - ambitions, temporal involvement
and rights - are ordinal variables which are measured on a five-point scale ranging from
0 to 4. The bivariate analysis relies on this measurement. The ordinal indicator for tax
planning ambitions takes on the value 0 if minimization of the group’s tax burden is not
at all important and thus, indicates the lowest parameter value. The highest parameter
value is 4 and represents the highest level of importance of the minimization of the tax
burden. Similarly, a 0 for temporal involvement indicates that the tax department is
involved late, while a 4 indicates an early involvement. And last, tax executives have
no rights in the decision process and are not consulted if the variable takes on the value
0, while they have a veto right if the variable takes on the value 4.
Table 6 presents findings from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and shows, for each of
the four dimensions of interest, the probability that a draw from the ’low’ group, in
terms of the seven distinct characteristics respectively, is larger than a draw from
the corresponding ’high’ group. Under the null hypothesis, the two groups do not
systematically differ and the probability to draw a larger value from the first group as
compared to the second is 50 percent.
Considering the results displayed in Table 6, the survey-based indicators for tax
planning efforts, tax planning ambitions, the timing of involvement and the ultimate
decision rights tend to show higher values for firms with low R&D intensity. In other
words, the probability to draw higher values from the group of firms with low R&D
intensity as compared to the group of firms with high R&D intensity is larger than
50 percent. More precisely, the probability that less R&D intensive firms exhibit more
tax planning efforts than highly R&D intensive firms is 55.4%. Similarly, we find that
the probability that less R&D intensive firms have higher tax planning ambitions is
slightly above 50%, the probability that they are earlier involved in the decision-making
is 64.1%. The probability that they have stronger ultimate decision rights is almost
60%. Although the differences between groups are, with the exception of what we
find for the timing of involvement, not statistically significant, the observed tendencies
regarding efforts, ambitions and temporal involvement are in line with our conjecture
that increasing R&D intensity leads tax departments to act more as a controller than
as a manager, with less tax planning efforts and ambitions and an involvement at a
later stage of the decision process. In turn, the dimension of ultimate decision rights
does not meet our expectation.
Interestingly, we find that low IP intensity is associated with lower tax planning
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efforts and ambitions. While the relationship between R&D intensity and tax plan-
ning efforts and ambitions appears negative, IP intensity thus has a positive impact
on these dimensions. With respect to ambitions, the difference between less and highly
IP intensive firms is statistically significant at 10% (Wilcoxon test) or 5% (t-test). We
consider this finding in line with IP intensity being a more precise proxy for tax plan-
ning opportunities subsequent to the investment decision than R&D intensity which
rather proxies for factors that prevents tax experts from getting actively involved in
tax planning, i.e. high costs of delay and, accordingly, a strong focus on time to market.
Furthermore, results in Table 6 document that the conventional determinants of
tax planning opportunities and tax planning behavior, which we take from previous
literature (see Section 1), do significantly impact on the temporal involvement of the
tax department but less so on the other dimensions of the tax department’s role in
the investment decision process. In particular, findings from the Wilcoxon test suggest
that tax executives in relatively small firms and less leveraged firms get involved rather
late in the decision process, i.e. the probability to draw higher values of our temporal
involvement indicator (where high values stand for early involvement) is significantly
reduced for these groups of firms. Moreover, in firms with low levels of inventory and
capital intensity, tax departments get involved earlier. Finally, we find that younger
tax departments tend to have weaker ultimate decision rights.
Table 6: Bivariate Analysis
Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
RDINT low>high 55.4% 52.4% 64.1%
∗
59.5%
IPINT low>high 38.7% 34.8%
∗
?? 51.0% 54.8%
SIZE low>high 46.0% 53.0% 35.6%
∗
? 37.9%
ROA low>high 47.6% 55.3% 45.5% 44.3%
LEV low>high 45.7% 47.4% 30.6%
∗∗
??? 34.0%
∗∗
??
GROW low>high 44.5% 49.7% 42.2% 41.8%
INVINT low>high 53.7% 47.8% 65.1%
∗
? 56.9%
CAPINT low>high 39.3% 48.4% 61.5%? 55.6%
AGE low>high 49.9% 53.8% 42.3% 35.0%
∗
Notes: Respondents are split by the median into two groups according to each conditioning variable,
listed on the left hand side of the table. It is then tested whether tax departments of one group and tax
departments of the other group of firms take different roles in the decision process, as reflected by their
tax planning efforts, ambitions, temporal involvement and ultimate decision rights. The probabilities
that one group differs from the other group are shown in the table and are based on a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test. Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level. Stars (?, ?? and ? ? ?) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level based on a
t-test. For example, with respect to R&D intensity, the probability that tax departments of less R&D
intensive firms make more tax planning efforts than tax departments in high R&D intensive firms is
55.4%.
Overall, the picture from the bivariate analysis is mixed. On the one hand, some of the
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results support the view that coordination of the tax department with other operational
units in R&D intensive firms is costly and may prompt tax experts in the firm to act
less as managers in the investment process but more as merely ratifying controllers. On
the other hand, only a few findings are statistically significant, an outcome which could
however be attributable to the small sample size. Importantly, we find that significant
differences between groups of firms according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are in most
cases confirmed by the alternative t-test for the difference between the group means
of the four dimensions considered. We conclude that inference based on conventional
parametric procedures is accurate despite potential concerns arising from the small
sample size.
5.2 Regression Analysis
The main results from the regression analyses are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Again,
we are primarily interested in whether R&D intensity has an impact on the tax depart-
ment’s role in the business decision process, as reflected by its tax planning efforts, tax
planning ambitions, the timing of involvement and ultimate decision rights. While tax
planning efforts is measured as a proportion, the other dimensions - ambitions, tempo-
ral involvement and rights - are dichotomous variables as described in Section 4. They
are measured as binary variables, where the variable takes on the value 1 if the original
answer was 3 or 4 on the five-point scale and 0 otherwise. Column 1 of Table 7 shows
the response of tax planning efforts, again measured by the approximate time (in % of
total workload) that is spent on tax planning activities, as opposed to activities linked
to compliance and financial reporting. Column 2 of Table 7 shows the response of tax
planning ambitions, measured as a dichotomous variable, which is 1 if tax minimization
is an important or very important objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise.
Column 3 of Table 7 shows the results for temporal involvement, again measured as
a dichotomous variable, which is 1 if the tax department gets involved early or even
very early in the initiation phase of the decision process, and 0 otherwise. Column 4 of
Table 7 shows the results for ultimate decision rights, again measured on a dichotomous
scale, where 1 reflects strong or even veto rights of the department.
Table 7 presents coefficient estimates from regressions of efforts, ambitions, tempo-
ral involvement and rights on R&D intensity and control variables. Standard errors
robust to heteroscadasticity are given in parentheses. The coefficient estimate of R&D
intensity on efforts (specification (1)) is -2.193 and statistically significant at 1%. This
result means that an increase of R&D intensity by one percentage point leads to a 2.2
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Table 7: Coordination Intensity in R&D Intensive MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
RDINT -2.193*** -3.354 -4.362** 3.609
(0.739) (3.337) (1.960) (2.412)
SIZE 0.033** -0.052 0.024 0.103*
(0.016) (0.063) (0.056) (0.058)
ROA -0.058 -0.944 0.728 0.410
(0.122) (0.702) (0.834) (0.709)
LEV -0.005 -0.040*** 0.024* 0.054***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
GROW 0.384*** 0.143 0.700** 0.893***
(0.088) (0.383) (0.277) (0.259)
INVINT 0.400 -0.685 -0.854 -0.205
(0.335) (1.163) (0.699) (0.794)
CAPINT -0.047 0.771 -0.905 -0.216
(0.190) (0.605) (0.568) (0.606)
AGE -0.073** -0.057 0.100 0.136
(0.033) (0.095) (0.089) (0.087)
Constant -0.252 2.212 0.046 -2.469*
(0.311) (1.444) (1.291) (1.435)
Observations 39 41 42 42
R-squared 0.410 0.208 0.333 0.319
Notes: All regressions are based on OLS estimation. While the dependent variable ’efforts’ is a propor-
tion, the variables ’ambitions’, ’temporal involvement’ and ’rights’ are binary variables. The dependent
variable ’efforts’ (specification (1)) represents the workload spent on tax planning relative to total
workload; ’ambitions’ (specification (2)) is 1 if tax minimization is an important or very important
objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise; ’temporal involvement’ (specification (3)) is 1 if the
tax department gets involved early or even very early in the initiation phase of the decision process,
and 0 otherwise; ’rights’ (specification (4)) is 1 if the tax department has strong or even veto rights in
the decision process. The four dimensions are regressed on firm characteristics, which are R&D inten-
sity (RDINT), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), firm growth (GROW), inventory
and capital intensity (INVINT and CAPINT) and age of the tax department (AGE). Asterisks (∗,
∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Heteroscadasticity robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
percentage point decrease of the proportion of workload spent on tax planning. The
regression results from the dimension ambitions are reported in specification (2) and
depict a different picture than the results from the effort-dimension. The coefficient
estimate of R&D intensity is not significant indicating that R&D intensive firms are
statistically not more or less ambitious to minimize their tax burden as compared to
less R&D intensive firms. Furthermore, we investigate at which stage during the plan-
ning phase of an investment project tax executives are involved in the decision-making
(see specification (3) of Table 7). We find that temporal involvement decreases in the
R&D intensity. Precisely, an increase in R&D intensity by one percentage point is as-
sociated with a decrease in the probability that tax executives are involved early in the
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decision-making by 4.36 percentage points. This finding supports our hypothesis that
coordination costs are too high to involve tax executives early in the decision-making
process. Last, we regress the dichotomous indicator for ultimate decision rights on R&D
intensity and controls and present results in specification (4). Contrary to the other
three dimensions efforts, ambitions and temporal involvement, R&D intensity has a
positive estimated coefficient. This would indeed suggest that with increasing R&D
intensity tax executives have stronger rights to oppose the decision made by other
departments. However, the positive coefficient of R&D intensity is not statistically
different from zero at all conventional levels of significance.
To sum up, we observe that R&D intensity seems to reduce the coordination inten-
sity of the tax department with other departments in the firm, at least in terms of
two of the four investigated dimensions. These two dimensions are the tax planning
efforts measured as time of total workload attributed to tax planning and the temporal
involvement of tax executives in the decision-making process. Tax executives indeed
get involved at later stages of the investment decision and do not intervene in initial
decisions such as investment location choices. With respect to the other dimensions,
however, we find no evidence that R&D intensive firms have more or less tax planning
ambitions and decision rights than less R&D intensive firms.
Clearly, R&D intensive firms tend to hold more intangible assets as compared to
less R&D intensive firms. A look at Table 5 documents a positive correlation (12.08%)
between the R&D intensity and the IP intensity of our respondent firms. As intangible
assets are highly specific, their true value is hardly observable for national tax author-
ities, which provides leeway for transfer price distortions. As a consequence, a transfer
of IP to low-tax affiliates may be attractive and require less planning efforts than direct
intervention in initial decisions about the set-up and location of production facilities. If
it is indeed easier for tax planners to tax-efficiently migrate IP within a multinational
than it is for them to tax-efficiently structure real R&D investments, firms may accept
forgone tax savings due to tax-inefficient R&D investments and will reverse part of
those tax inefficiencies by means of tax-optimal transfers of their intangibles ex post.
In other words, tax planning in R&D intensive firms takes place, but it takes place less
with respect to R&D but with respect to IP location. In Figure 1 presented in Section
2, these ex post profit shifting opportunities by means of IP migration trigger a shift
of the autonomy cost curve in Figure 1 to the left.
If IP intensity is indeed a determinant of the tax department’s function in the firm,
the coefficients for R&D intensity reported in Table 7 are actually ’biased’ in the
sense that they reflect the net effect of variation in R&D intensity and covarying IP
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Table 8: Coordination Intensity in R&D and IP Intensive MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
RDINT -2.670*** -6.435** -3.860* 4.313*
(0.651) (2.719) (2.166) (2.407)
IPINT 0.279** 1.797*** -0.441 -0.619
(0.125) (0.512) (0.505) (0.408)
SIZE 0.031* -0.069 0.032 0.115**
(0.015) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
ROA -0.090 -1.146* 0.775 0.475
(0.117) (0.626) (0.868) (0.727)
LEV -0.005 -0.039*** 0.022* 0.052***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
GROW 0.390*** 0.187 0.682** 0.868***
(0.093) (0.361) (0.276) (0.259)
INVINT 0.476 -0.210 -0.833 -0.176
(0.307) (1.015) (0.712) (0.804)
CAPINT -0.089 0.533 -0.900 -0.209
(0.170) (0.555) (0.582) (0.592)
AGE -0.080*** -0.100 0.099 0.135
(0.024) (0.103) (0.086) (0.085)
Constant -0.196 2.586** -0.097 -2.670*
(0.324) (1.243) (1.330) (1.368)
Observations 39 41 42 42
R-squared 0.474 0.439 0.347 0.345
Notes: All regressions are based on OLS estimation. While the dependent variable ’efforts’ is a pro-
portion, the variables ’ambitions’, ’temporal involvement’ and ’rights’ are binary variables. The de-
pendent variable ’efforts’ (specification (1)) represents the workload spent on tax planning relative to
total workload; ’ambitions’ (specification (2)) is 1 if tax minimization is an important or very impor-
tant objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise; ’temporal involvement’ (specification (3)) is
1 if the tax department gets involved early or even very early in the initiation phase of the decision
process, and 0 otherwise; ’rights’ (specification (4)) is 1 if the tax department has strong or even veto
rights in the decision process. The four dimensions are regressed on firm characteristics, which are
R&D intensity (RDINT), IP intensity (IPINT), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV),
firm growth (GROW), inventory and capital intensity (INVINT and CAPINT) and age of the tax
department (AGE). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level. Heteroscadasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
intensity. We now would like to disentangle the effect of R&D and the effect of IP on
the tax department’s role by additionally including a specific proxy for IP tax planning
opportunities into our previous regression framework. We employ IP intensity (IPINT),
calculated as the balance sheet item of intangible asset holdings scaled by total assets.
As IFRS requires capitalization of both acquired and self-created intangible assets,17
17IAS 38.57 defines under which circumstances self-created IP has to be capitalized in the books.
Accordingly, ’development costs are capitalized only after technical and commercial feasibility of the
asset for sale or use have been established. This means that the entity must intend and be able to
complete the intangible asset and either use it or sell it and be able to demonstrate how the asset will
generate future economic benefits’.
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the IP intensity we extract from the consolidated accounts of the responding public18
European multinational firms proxies well for the success of past innovative activity and
arising actual profit shifting opportunities. Some countries allow for the capitalization
of acquired intangibles only.19 Still, even in these cases IP intensity reflects that part
of profit shifting potential associated with acquired IP. The results of augmenting the
empirical model with IP intensity are presented in Table 8.
Interestingly, we see that the effect of R&D intensity persists and is even stronger
if we additionally control for IP intensity. Considering Column (1) of Table 8, a one
percentage point increase in R&D intensity statistically significantly decreases the share
of tax planning efforts in the tax department’s total workload by -2.670 percentage
points. At the same time, IP intensity shows a small but significant and positive impact
on tax planning efforts. In particular, a one percentage point increase in IP intensity
increases the share of tax planning efforts in the tax department’s total workload by
0.279 percentage points. This finding supports our conjecture that efforts associated
with IP tax planning do not outweigh the reductions in tax planning efforts associated
with the tax experts’ reduced intervention in real investment decisions. As shown in
Column (1) of Table 7 already, the net effect of R&D intensity on tax planning efforts
thus is negative. Looking at the dimension ambitions (Column (2) of Table 8), including
IP intensity into the regression model turns both coefficients of R&D and IP intensity
significant. While an increase in the R&D intensity by one percentage point leads to a
decline in the probability that the respondent rates the minimization of the tax burden
as important goal for the tax department by 6.44 percentage points, the same increase
in the IP intensity leads to an increase in the probability to have an ambitious tax
department by 1.8 percentage points. Interestingly, the effects are contrary to each
other, which explains our previous finding in Column (2) of Table 7, where R&D
intensity captures the net effect and therefore turned out insignificant. With respect
to the dimension temporal involvement of the tax executives in the decision-making
process (Column (3) of Table 8), the effect of R&D intensity persists when we include IP
intensity. In particular, a one percentage point increase in R&D intensity is associated
with a decline in the probability that the tax executives are involved early in the
18Note, that only publicly traded European firms are obliged to report their consolidated financial
statements based on IFRS, see the Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 19 July 2002. In our sample, these are 17 firms.
19According to US GAAP, Standard ASC 350, internal research and development costs are generally
immediately expensed. There are a few exceptions for computer software or website development.
Moreover, our dataset contains five publicly traded Swiss companies. In Switzerland, since 2005 most
Swiss companies that are listed on the main board of the Swiss Exchange have an obligation to report
either in IFRS or in US GAAP.
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decision-making by 3.86 percentage points. Similarly, the effect of IP intensity is also
negative, though insignificant. Nevertheless, this finding supports our conjecture that
tax planning takes place only at a later stage in the R&D process. Consequently, R&D
and IP intensive firms do not see the need for involving tax executives early in the
decision-making on a new investment project. Rather, they optimize the legal structure
given the target location of an investment, because the cost of autonomy is lower as
compared to the cost of coordination. Last, we investigate the effect of R&D and IP
intensity on the ultimate decision rights of tax executives. The first results in Column
(4) of Table 7 did not show a significant impact of R&D intensity on rights. When
including IP intensity though, we indeed find that R&D intensity exerts a significantly
positive effect on rights (Column (4) of Table 8). Thus, a one percentage point increase
in R&D intensity is associated with an increase in the probability that the tax experts
have a veto right in the decision-making process by 4.31 percentage points.
Overall, our results reveal interesting insights in the decision-making of R&D and IP
intensive firms and suggest that tax planning activities take place at different stages
in the R&D process. Coordination between the tax department and other operational
units is negatively affected by R&D intensity. In other words, within R&D intensive
firms coordination with the tax department is too costly and therefore, the tax de-
partment adopts more controlling than managerial tasks. If the tax department is less
strongly involved in the management, the firm runs into the danger to incur costs by
forgone tax savings. This, however, can be mitigated by tax planning opportunities
that arise with respect to intangible assets. Overall, our findings reconcile previous
evidence that taxes matter less for R&D intensive firms when it comes to investment
choices (Overesch and Schreiber, 2010) while overall they have been shown to report
lower ETRs on average (Graham et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2010; Graham et al.,
2014).
5.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we document the results from a large series of sensitivity analyses
assessing robustness of the results from our baseline estimations in Tables 7 and 8.
First, we include industry dummies as suggested by Wilson et al. (1993). Wilson et al.
(1993) provides descriptive and qualitative evidence that the industry a firm operates
in strongly determines the organizational and incentive structure of firms. For example,
the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industry may be similar in many respects, but differ
substantially with respect to gross margins. Pharmaceuticals have higher gross margins
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and, therefore, will incur higher losses if they fail to become the first patent applicant.
Consequently, their costs of delay, which are part of coordination costs, are much higher
than those of firms operating in other industries. Furthermore, the chemical industry
differs from the pharmaceuticals industry in that transportation costs are substantially
higher in the chemical industry. Hence, firms in the chemical industry face a higher
pressure to locate their production facilities close to their major markets and suppliers
to minimize transportation costs. The baseline regressions presented in Tables 7 and
8 are re-estimated with the inclusion of industry dummies. The results are shown in
Table 9. Despite the reduction in degrees of freedom associated with the inclusion
of industry dummies, the coefficients of RDINT again turn out significant and show
expected signs. Quantitatively, the effects of R&D intensity on the four dimensions of
the tax department’s role within the business process are larger than without modeling
of industry fixed effects. According to the results shown in Table 9, the effect of IP
intensity is smaller in magnitude and is statistically significant only with respect to the
ambitions of the tax department (specification (4) of Table 9).
As a second robustness check we extended our empirical model by a further variable
that captures whether compensation contracts of tax executives are based on some
kind of after-tax performance measure. The variable is drawn from our survey. We ask
whether compensation of tax executives is based on some kind of performance mea-
sure and give four possible options, namely yes, an after-tax measure; yes, a before-tax
measure; yes, other and no. We then dichotomize the variable to include it in our
regression framework as compensation variable (COMP), where it takes on the value
1 if compensation of tax executives is based on some after-tax performance measure
and 0 otherwise. Disregarding compensation contracts of tax executives could lead
to omitted variable bias. Performance-based compensation typically aims at limiting
agency costs as suggested by contracting theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1992). Perfor-
mance measurement that is based on after-tax measures may motivate managers to
care more about the tax consequences of their decisions. Consequently, managers may
coordinate more intensively with the tax department. Thus, the four dimensions we use
to measure the tax departments management-control-decision are likely influenced by
compensation contracts. A common after-tax performance measure in this respect is
the reported GAAP ETR of the firm, because it measures the total tax expense scaled
by pre-tax profit. Empirical evidence suggests that indeed firms whose managers are
compensated based on some after-tax performance measure report lower ETRs on av-
erage (Armstrong et al., 2012; Phillips, 2003). We therefore include the tax executives
compensation into our modified model. The results are presented in Table 10. In gen-
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eral, the results support our hypothesis that the tax department in R&D intensive
firms acts more as a controller than as a manager. Including compensation in the em-
pirical model even renders the coefficient estimates of our variables of interest slightly
larger in size. The compensation variable itself, however, stays mostly insignificant.
Moreover, we considerably lose observations when including COMP in our regressions
as it is missing for a number of firms. We therefore consider it as a robustness check
and do not include it in our baseline analyses.
Furthermore, we re-estimate our baseline analyses using a non-linear probability
model and present the results in Table 11. In our baseline model we decided to follow
a linear approach, due to better small sample characteristics of OLS than non-linear
probability models. To check robustness, we run the non-linear probit model using the
dichotomized variables. The probit regression model is designed for estimation with
a binary dependent variable and for capturing the non-linearity in the probabilities
(Greene, 2012). Table 11 presents average marginal effects of the included covariates
on the probabilities to show high tax planning ambitions, get involved early, and be
assigned strong ultimate decision rights, respectively. Considering the results from the
probit regression, the estimates of R&D intensity are significant and show the expected
signs just as in the baseline model. For IP intensity we also find effects similar to our
baseline results. However, according to column (6) of Table 11, IP intensity has a
negative and significant effect on the ultimate decision rights of the tax department,
whereas its effect was insignificant according to the baseline findings. With the excep-
tion of specification (2) of Table 11, estimated effect sizes of both R&D and IP intensity
turn out quantitatively consistent to the baseline findings.
Thus, we conclude that our results are qualitatively, and mostly quantitatively, ro-
bust towards different estimation methods. Furthermore, the results also hold when
estimating an ordered probit regression model using the original variables that range
from 0 to 4.20
20The results from the ordered probit estimation are not tabulated but available from the authors
upon request.
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Table 11: Robustness Check: Probit Estimation Model
Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDINT -3.692 -31.701*** -4.116** -3.882** 5.354*** 6.615***
(2.348) (11.304) (1.927) (1.957) (2.072) (2.325)
IPINT 11.073*** -0.388 -0.814*
(3.448) (0.389) (0.489)
SIZE -0.037 -0.331*** -0.006 0.008 0.023 0.044
(0.062) (0.107) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055)
ROA -2.082* -5.264*** 0.862 0.712 0.946 0.734
(1.217) (1.628) (0.727) (0.732) (0.633) (0.662)
LEV -0.607 -0.727 0.542 0.378 0.723* 0.451
(0.527) (0.597) (0.480) (0.518) (0.417) (0.519)
GROW 0.677 1.859*** 0.852 0.779 1.277** 1.150**
(0.902) (0.677) (0.612) (0.545) (0.578) (0.566)
INVINT -0.693 0.307 -0.900 -0.975 -1.222 -1.345
(0.918) (0.748) (0.590) (0.628) (0.910) (0.847)
CAPINT 0.813 -0.376 -0.855 -0.934 0.371 0.514
(0.658) (0.382) (0.523) (0.578) (0.438) (0.453)
AGE -0.039 -0.792*** 0.084 0.086 0.180*** 0.221***
(0.090) (0.296) (0.068) (0.065) (0.060) (0.073)
Observations 41 41 42 42 42 42
Notes: The table presents average marginal effects for non-linear probit estimations. The dependent
variables ’ambitions’, ’temporal involvement’ and ’rights’ are binary variables. The dependent variable
’efforts’ (specification (1) and (2)) represents the workload spent on tax planning relative to total
workload; ’ambitions’ (specification (3) and (4)) is 1 if tax minimization is an important or very
important objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise; ’temporal involvement’ (specification (5)
and (6)) is 1 if the tax department gets involved early or even very early in the initiation phase of
the decision process, and 0 otherwise; ’rights’ (specification (7) and (8)) is 1 if the tax department
has strong or even veto rights in the decision process. The four dimensions are regressed on firm
characteristics, which are R&D intensity (RDINT), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage
(LEV), firm growth (GROW), inventory and capital intensity (INVINT and CAPINT) and age of the
tax department (AGE). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level. Heteroscadasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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6 Conclusion
By locating intangible assets at low-tax affiliates, R&D intensive multinationals can
reduce the tax burden on a relevant fraction of their economic rents. The corporate
production process, however, does not only involve administration of intangible assets.
These companies also have to decide on where to set up R&D facilities and final output
production for consumers. This study contributes to better understand the particular-
ities of tax decision-making in R&D intensive multinational firms. In particular, we
focus on the allocation of management and control functions to the tax department,
adding a new facet to the literature dealing with the interrelationship between tax
decision-making and organizational architecture.
Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012 of 47 top financial and tax
managers of very large multinational companies, we develop and test a theory, based
on the organizational design literature, for the intensity in which the tax department
coordinates with managers from other business units to intervene with real investment
decisions. According to organizational design theory, the optimal allocation of decision
rights to managers inside the firm is determined by coordination costs that are incurred
when centralization of management and control is high and the costs of autonomy
that arise when management and control are exercised separately. We argue that this
coordination problem also drives the choice of whether the tax department serves a
controlling function or whether, instead, it acts more as a manager. We consider R&D
intensity to be an important determinant of both the costs of coordination and the
costs of autonomy. First, there is high pressure in R&D intensive industries to keep
the time to market short and coordination costs in form of time delays associated with
coordination between business units are very high. Second, costs of autonomy are low
in R&D intensive firms as tax-inefficiencies from autonomous decision-making without
involvement of tax experts can be reversed by separating and tax-optimally allocating
intangibles within the multinational group.
We indeed document supporting evidence that in R&D intensive multinational firms
the tax department operates more as a controller than as a manager. In particular, tax
departments of R&D intensive firms make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to
minimize the tax burden of the firm, are later involved in the decision-making process
of a new investment project, but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision
on a new investment project as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Conditional on
R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets in the firm is associated with
more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results are statistically significant and
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robust towards several sensitivity checks.
We acknowledge that our findings can only be considered a first piece of evidence
due to the qualifications associated with small sample surveys. However, this first
piece of evidence is important as it represents another illustration of the association
between organizational design theory and the integration of the tax function in the
hierarchical structure of firms. In this sense, we take another important step towards
unraveling the black box of tax avoidance. Opening further parts of this black box is
urgently required in view of the OECD’s and the G20’s major initiative to restrain what
they call base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) (OECD, 2013a,b). Understanding the
intentional and unintentional consequences of profit shifting restrictions requires a good
understanding of the tax planning mechanisms inside multinational firms and how these
interact with business decision processes.
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